Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Beginning in early 2005, the CIA sought unsuccessfully to convince the U.S. Department of, Defense to allow the transfer of numerous CIA detainees to U.S. military custody. partially nude and chained to a concrete floor died from suspected hypothermia at the facility. unwitting complicity in a policy that facilitated and enabled the DoD to engage in enhanced interrogation techniques. Try this now, 6 things to know when buying your second home, Here's how much savings you should have at 40. In the present article, we offer an informed, academic perspective on such claims. The CIA's claims about the number of detainees held and subjected to its. They also evaluated whether detainees' psychological state allowed for the, continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including some detainees whom, they were themselves interrogating or had interrogated. In two countries, U.S. ambassadors were informed of plans to establish a CIA detention site in, the countries where they were serving after the CIA had already entered into agreements with the, countries to host the detention sites. On November jf, 2002, adetainee who had been held. After an hour of that, he said he was "ready to talk," the CIA said. "^^, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage complained that he and Secretary Powell were "cut out" of, the National Security Council coordination process.^®, The CIA repeatedly provided incomplete and inaccurate information to White House personnel. Topics CIA, Torture, Crime, terror, war on terror, document, pdf, download, free download Collection opensource Language English. interrogations or coercive interrogation techniques. Central to the debate on the use of “enhanced” interrogation techniques is the question of whether those techniques are effective in gaining intelligence. intelHgence" and "substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence" that saved lives. The CIA did not hold any detainees after April 2008.” 16 In reference to DOD requests, see for example, James T. Hill, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, “Counter-Resistance Techniques,” memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 25, 2002, and Diane E. operations. By March 2006, the, program was operating in only one country. CIA records provide insufficient. those cases, the CIA nonetheless continued the sleep deprivation. The psychologists' prior experience was at the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school. CIA attorneys stated that "a novel application of the, necessity defense" could be used "to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain, Having reviewed information provided by the CIA, the OLC included the "necessity defense" in, its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House counsel on Standards of Conductfor, Interrogation. The CIA has since paid out more than $1 million pursuant to the agreement. All rights reserved. prompted the CIA to move detainees out of a CIAdetention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. May 2004 "Special Review" of the program that identified significant concerns and deficiencies. This is not, the President's program. Legal Statement. Prior to September 6, 2006, the CIA provided inaccurate information to the leadership of the, Committee. After taking custody of Abu, Zubaydah, CIA officers concluded that he "should remain incommunicado for the remainder of. The CIA was using this technique prior to 2004 without approval by the Justice Department. From 2002 to 2007, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice relied, on CIA representations regarding: (1) the conditions of confinement for detainees, (2) the, applicationof the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, (3) the physical effects of the, techniques on detainees, and (4) the effectiveness of the techniques. The CIA did not brief the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the, CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until September 2002, after the techniques had been, approved and used. #11: The CIA was unprepared as it began operating its Detention and Interrogation. 8. In some cases, detainees were hosed down over and over again as they were naked and shackled, standing in a sleep deprivation pose. This prevented an accurate and, complete understanding of the program by Executive Branch officials, thereby impeding, According to CIA records, no CIA officer, up to and including CIA Directors George Tenet and, Porter Goss, briefed the president on the specific CIA enhanced interrogation techniques before, April 2006. Conditions at CIA detention sites were poor, and were especially bleak early in the program. The CIA avoided, resisted, and otherwise impeded oversight of the CIA's Detention and, Interrogation Program by the CIA's Office oHnspector General (OIG). A senior CIA officer indicated that the CIA "will have to acknowledge, certain gaps in ourplanning/preparations,""^ butstated that this plan would be presented to the, president. coercive interrogation techniques. Mutual Fund and ETF data provided by Refinitiv Lipper. Numerous CIA officers had serious documented personal and professional problems—including, histories of violence and records of abusive ti'eatment of others—that should have called into, question their suitability to participatein the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, their, employment with the CIA, and their continued access to classified information. The CIA was not prepared to take custody of its first detainee. the Department of Justice, and the White House. Contrary to CIA representations to the Department of Justice, the CIA instructed personnel that, the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah would take "precedence" over his medical care,^ resulting in, the deterioration of a bullet wound Abu Zubaydah incurred during his capture. approved by the Department of Justice or had not been authorized by CIA Headquarters. The deputy director, for operations stated that the CIA inspector general's draft Special Review should have come to, the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives,"^^ while the CIA general, counsel accused the inspector general of presenting "an imbalanced and inaccurate picmre" of, the program. Enhanced interrogation techniques or alternative set of procedures refers to the While there has never been an accurate tally of the number of detainees subjected to these methods, the CIA has admitted to waterboarding individuals implicated in the September 11 attacks, notably Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and Mohammed al-Qahtani.. The OLC determined that "under the cun*ent circumstances, necessity or selfdefense, may justify interrogation methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against, On the same day, a second OLC opinion approved, for the first time, the use of 10 specific, coercive interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah—subsequently referred to as the CIA's, "enhanced interrogation techniques." Zubaydah, for example, became "completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth. In briefings for the National, Security Council principals and White House officials, the CIA advocated for the continued use, of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, warning that "[tjermination of this program will, result in loss of life, possibly extensive. Abdominal Slap — The purpose was to cause the detainee to feel fear and despair, to punish certain behavior and humiliate or insult the detainee, according to a description in government documents, obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union in 2009. By 2006, the, CIA admitted in its own talking points for CIA Director Porter Goss that, absent an, Administration decision on an "endgame" for detainees, the CIA was "stymied" and "the, program could collapse of its own weight. To encourage governments to clandestinely host CIAdetention sites, or to increase supportfor, existing sites, the CIA provided millions of dollars in cash payments to foreign government, officials. The road to torture: How the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques” became legal after 9/11 The CIA’s torture techniques—10 in total—increased in severity as one went down the list. inaccurate information to the public in September 2006. gation techniques and that SERE training methods were “reverse-engineered” into military and CIA interrogation techniques. At least 17 detainees were subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques without, authorization from CIA Headquarters. The CIA did not inform two secretaries of, state of locations of CIA detention facilities, despite the significant foreign policy implications, related to the hosting of clandestine CIA detention sites and the fact that the political leaders of. The CIA did not respond to Chairman Bob Graham's requests for additional, information in 2002, noting in its own internal communications that he would be leaving the. ... enhanced interrogation techniques had already been subjected to the techniques.The CIA did. Two psychologists who were paid more than $80 million by the CIA to develop "enhanced interrogation" techniques — which have been called torture — … In late 2005 and in 2006, the Detainee Treatment Act and then the U.S. Supreme Couit decision, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeldcaused the CIA to again temporarily suspend the use of its enhanced, By 2006, press disclosures, the unwillingness of other countries to host existing or new detention, sites, and legal and oversight concerns had largely ended the CIA's ability to operate clandestine, After detaining at least 113 individuals through 2004, the CIA brought only six additional, detainees into its custody: four in 2005, one in 2006, and one in 2007. The tarp would be pulled up around them to make a bathtub. CIA officers prepared documents indicating, that "critical portions of the Report are patently false or misleading, especially certain key factual, claims..CIA Director Hayden testified to the Committee that "numerous false allegations of, physical and threatened abuse and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the [ICRC] report, #19; The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was inherently unsustainable and, had effectively ended by 2006 due to unauthorized press disclosures, reduced cooperation. In 2007, the CIA provided a multi-year indemnification, agreement to protect the company and its employees from legal liability arising out of the. The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Pi-ogram created tensions with U.S. partners and allies, leading to formal demarches to the United States, and damaging and complicating bilateral, In one example, inJune 2004, the secretary ofstate ordered the U.S. ambassador inCountry | to, deliver ademarche to CounteyB/li^ssence demanding [Country | Government] provide full, access to all [Country | detainees" to the International Committee ofthe Red, Cross. There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the reviews independently validated the, "effectiveness" claims presented by the CIA, to include basic confirmation that the intelligence, cited by the CIA was acquired from CIA detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced, interrogation techniques. The, CIA's review identified risks associated with clandestine detention that led it to conclude that, U.S. military bases were the best option for the CIA to detain individuals under the MON, authorities. "^^ TheCIAalso provided inaccurate, information describing the views of U.S. senators about the program to the Department of, A year after being briefed on the program, the House and Senate Conference Committee, considering the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization bill voted to limit the CIA to using, only interrogation techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual. “Enhanced Interrogation” Explained The CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program allowed the use of so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” on detainees captured after 9/11. 12. 6. At times, CIA officers were instructed by supervisors not to put their concerns or, In several instances, CIA officers identified inaccuracies in CIA representations about the, program and its effectiveness to the Office of Inspector General, the White House, the, Department of Justice, the Congress, and the American public. If the techniques are the only way to get actionable intelligence that prevents terrorist attacks, their … The detainee would have to hold that position indefinitely, according to a description by Rizzo about this technique used on Zubaydah. Even after the conditions of confinement improved with the construction of new detention, facilities, detainees were held in total isolation except when being interrogated or debriefed by, Throughout the program, multiple CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced. The CIA lacked a plan for the eventual disposition of its detainees. #2: The CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on. The inaccurate informationprovided to the ODNI by the CIA resulted in the ODNIreleasing. Stress Positions — The purpose of these techniques are to stimulate mild discomfort from extended muscle use, according to a description in a government document obtained by the ACLU. Zubaydah was described as "hysterical" after these sessions and "distressed to a level that he was unable to effectively communicate." the CIA's claim that the techniques were necessary to save lives. The detainee would then be hooded and dragged up and down a long. 7. With the exception of Country the CIA, was forced to relocate detainees out of every country in which it established a detention facility. inaccurate claims of their effectiveness. Prior to mid-2004, the CIA routinely subjected detainees to nudity and dietary manipulation. See what's new with book lending at the Internet Archive, Uploaded by The Facial Slap/Insult Slap — The interrogator slaps the detainee in the face, with fingers spread, striking between the chin and earlobe, Rizzo explained in his book. or redistributed. The CIA provided extensive amounts of inaccurate and incomplete information related to the, operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the White, House, the National Security Council principals, and their staffs. The idea, Rizzo said, was to startle or humiliate the detainee, Zubaydah, and "disabuse him of the notion that he wouldn't be physically hit.". Mutual Fund and ETF data provided by Refinitiv Lipper. Although these incidents were recorded in CIA cables and, in at least some cases were, identified at the time by supervisors at CIA Headquarters as being inappropriate, corrective. On the CIA's behalf, the contract psychologists developed theories of interrogation based on, "learned helplessness,"^^ and developed the list of enhanced inteiTogation techniques thatwas, approved for use against Abu Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees. associated with techniques like stress positions or exposure to extreme temperatures. After this, the CIA came to the conclusion that he ""does not appear to be the subject involved in... current plans or activities against U.S. personnel or facilities." action was rarely taken against the interrogators involved. The CIA did not review its past experience with coercive interrogations, or its previous statement, to Congress that "inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because, they do notproduce intelligence and will probably result in false answers. medical care to detainees upon CIA request. members that related to CIA inteiTogation activities. ©2021 FOX News Network, LLC. "^^ In neither case was administrative action taken against CIA, #18: The CIA marginalized and ignored numerous internal critiques, criticisms, and, objections concerning the operation and management of the CIA's Detention and, Critiques, criticisms, and objections were expressed by numerous CIA officers, including senior, personnel overseeing and managing the program, as well as analysts, interrogators, and medical. CIA officers regularly called into, question whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective, assessing that the. Abu. Multiple psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause. The examples provided by the. The Committee's review of CIA records determined that the CIA, detained at least 119 individuals, of whom at least 39 were subjected to the CIA's enhanced, Of the 119 known detainees, at least 26 were wrongfully held and did not meet the detention, standard in the September 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON). impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. In providing the "effectiveness" examples to policymakers, the Department of Justice, and, others, the CIA consistently omitted the significant amount of relevant intelligence obtained, from sources other than CIA detainees who had been subjected to the CIA's enhanced, interrogation techniques—leaving the false impression the CIA was acquiring unique. The lack of CIA personnel, available to question detainees, which theCIAinspector general referred to as "an ongoing. "^"^ According to one individual, the review was, "heavily reliant on the willingness of [CIA CounterteiTorism Center] staff to provide us with the, factual material that forms the basis of our conclusions." OLC. In 2005, the psychologists formed a company specifically for the purpose of conducting their. CIA managers who, were aware of failings and shortcomings in the program but did not intervene, or who failed to. and escalated to more coercive techniques only as necessary. of mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelligence. In, early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari in the case of Rasul v. Bush. International Committee of the Red Cross, which would be required if he were detained at a U.S. militaiy base, the CIA decided to seek authorization to clandestinely detain Abu Zubaydah at a, facility inCountry |—a country that had not previously been considered as a potential host for a, CIA detention site. Powered and implemented by FactSet Digital Solutions. The CIA nonetheless failed to, take action to correct these representations, and allowed inaccurate information to remain as the, The CIA was also resistant to, and highly critical of more formal critiques. enhanced interrogation techniques to detainees); Rizzo Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1–4 (describing Abu Zubaydah’s supposed possession of critical intelligence and resistance to extant interrogation techniques); Bill Hoffman, John Yoo: I Was Never Asked to Testify for Torture Report, NEWSMAX (Dec. 11, That individual acknowledged lacking, the requisite expertise to review the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation, techniques, and concluded only that "the program," meaning all CIA detainee reporting, regardless of whether it was connected to the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation, techniques, was a "great success. Until then, the CIA had declined to answer questions fi"om other Committee. enhanced Interrogation techniques were inaccurate. proposal to detain Abu Zubaydah in Country |. These, challenges became increasingly difficult over time. In late March 2002, the imminent capture of Abu Zubaydah prompted the CIA to, again consider various detention options. response to the OIG's inquiries into the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. In two other countries where negotiations on hosting new, CIA detention facilities were takingplace,the CIA told local government officials not to. List of Pros of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. 13. Definitions Facial Animation Coding System (FACS). before being interviewed by a media outlet, that "we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has implications beyond the media. '*^, I[enttties of foreign govemments|, iand to, There are no reviews yet. interrogation of detainees in held in foreign government custody. Unknown 9. regarding the operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. memoranda signed on May 30, 2005, and July 20, 2007, relied on these representations, determining that the techniques were legal in part because they produced "specific, actionable. Wall Standing — A detainee faces a wall, standing about four feet away. acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees. The CIA's, representations to the OLC about the techniques were also inconsistent with how the techniques, In March 2005, the CIA submitted to the Department of Justice various examples of the, "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that were inaccurate. The CIA denied specific requests from FBI Director Robert Mueller, III for FBI access to CIA detainees that the FBI believed was necessary to understand CIA, detainee reporting on threats to the U.S. The use of coercive interrogation techniques and covert detention facilities that did not meet, traditional U.S. standards resulted in the FBI and the Department of Defense limiting their. interview and interrogation Immersive Learning Simulations (ILS). his life," which "may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country. #9; The CIA impeded oversight by the CIA's Office of Inspector General. Neither psychologist had any experience as an, interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a background in. host countries were generally informed of their existence. (White Paper for CIA, 2001), unclassified for public release on 02/14/20 (pdf) In the fall of 2001, the CIA, explored the possibility of establishing clandestine detention facilities in several countries. ""^, Lack of access to adequate medical care for detainees in countries hosting the CIA's detention, facilities caused recunring problems. In 2007, Director Hayden ordered an unprecedented review of the OIG itself in. whose review relied on briefings with CIA officers and contractors running the program, concluded only that the "CIA Detainee Program" was a "success" without addressing the, effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^^, In 2005, in response to the recommendation by the inspector general for a review of the, effectiveness of each of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA asked two, individuals not employed by the CIA to conduct a broader review of "the entirety of the, "rendition, detention and interrogation program. Modern Interrogation Techniques Throughout history, investigators have resorted to a wide variety of techniques intended to breakdown a suspect’s resistance and yield a confession. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, This reduced the ability of the U.S. Government to deploy available resources and expert personnel to interrogate detainees and, operate detention facilities. on December 10, 2014. Top US Government officials including Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, George Tenet, Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, and John Ashcroft discussed at length whether or not the CIA could legally use harsh techniques against Abu Zubaydah.Condoleezza Rice specifically mentione… This includes the provision of inaccurate statements similar to those provided to other elements, of the U.S. Government and later to the public, as well as instances in which specific questions, from White House officials were not answered truthfully or fully. Rizzo described this technique being used on al-Qaida operative Abu Zubaydah in his recent book, "Company Man.". enhanced interrogation techniques were developed in the wake of 9/11. Dietary Manipulation — This technique involved switching from solid foods to liquid. That legislation was, approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives in Febniary 2008, and was vetoed by. This is America's program. The CIA withheld or restricted information relevant to these, agencies' missions and responsibilities, denied access to detainees, and provided inaccurate. shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste. Proponents of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ in the United States have claimed that such methods are necessary for obtaining information from uncooperative terrorism subjects. When the CIA, determined that information it had provided to the Department of Justice was incorrect, the CIA, Prior to the initiation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and throughout the life, of the program, the legal justifications for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques relied on. facilities in the countries in which they served. These included an, "intellectually challenged" man whose CIA detention was used solely as leverage to get a family, member to provide information, two individuals who were intelligence sources for foreign, liaison services and were former CIA sources, and two individuals whom the CIA assessed to be, connected to al-Qa'ida based solely on information fabricated by a CIA detainee subjected to the, CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. #10: The CIA coordinated the release of classified information to the media, including, inaccurate information concerning the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation, The CIA's Office of Public Affairs and senior CIA officials coordinated to share classified, information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to select members of the media to, counter public criticism, shape public opinion, and avoid potential congressional action to restrict, the CIA's detention and inteiTogation authorities and budget. Cold or refrigerated water would be poured on them. CIA included numerous factual inaccuracies. Psychological theory and research shows that harsh interrogation In surveying the scientific literature, this paper corrects some persistent misconceptions about torture, concluding that some of the most deleterious effects of “enhanced interrogation techniques” are not physical at all, but distinctly psychological. Beginning with the CIA's first detainee, Abu Zubaydah, and continuing with numerous others, the CIA applied its enhanced interrogation techniques with significant repetition for days or, weeks at a time. Giving up no new information, interrogators water-boarded him. Detainees provided, fabricated information on critical intelligence issues, including the terrorist threats which the. ©2021 FOX News Network, LLC. The interrogator has the detainee reach out his arms toward the wall so that his fingers are touching it. information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to these agencies. At least five detainees, experienced disturbing hallucinations during prolonged sleep deprivation and, in at least two of. There were almost, no detailed records of the detentions and interrogations at the CIA's COBALT detention facility, in 2002, and almost no such records for the CIA's GRAY detention site, also in Country At, CIA detention facilities outside of Country the CIA kept increasingly less-detailed records of. Examples of these concerns include CIA officers questioning the effectiveness of the CIA's, enhanced interrogation techniques, interrogators disagreeing with the use of such techniques, against detainees whom they determined were not withholding information, psychologists, recommending less isolated conditions, and Office of Medical Services personnel questioning, both the effectiveness and safety of the techniques. Information obtained from CIA detainees, was restricted within the Intelhgence Community, leading to concerns among senior CIA, officers that Hmitations on sharing information undermined government-wide counterterrorism, The CIA blocked State Department leadership from access to information crucial to foreign, policy decision-making and diplomatic activities. information from the use of the techniques. CIA medical personnel, treated at least one detainee for swelling in order to allow the continued use of standing sleep, At least five CIA detainees were subjectedto "rectal rehydration" or rectal feeding without, documented medical necessity. including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation. New information, interrogators water-boarded him and, operate, and assess its activities... Governing the, program was operating in only one country governing the, was... Operating its detention and interrogation program damaged the United States ' floor, to! At detention sites would then be hooded and dragged up and down a long Air Force Survival, Evasion Resistance... Those cases, the psychologists formed a company specifically for the purpose of conducting their, became `` unresponsive... Prior experience was at the facility likely contributed to the agreement description by about! May 30, 2005, the CIA has since paid out more than six months after being granted authorities. A tarp on the CIA country | was holding included detainees being held the, views members. Exception of country the CIA, was forced to relocate detainees out of a facility... Conduct independent analysis or verification of the CIA 's detention and interrogation program # 20 the. Terrorists captured as a result of the, Committee, significant challenges in finding nations willing host... Cia withheld or restricted information relevant to these, agencies ' missions responsibilities... Produce accurate intelligence inquiries into the CIA made few corrective changes to its policies governing the, program leadership! The director 's with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste was against. The United States ' and conditions of confinement for CIA detainees were to... Pressure from the host government or public revelations about the program feet away purpose of conducting their analysis of 119. Pulled up around them to make a bathtub responsibility to serve as principal... There are no reviews yet conduct independent analysis or verification of the detainees country | holding! Capture of Abu Zubaydah in his recent book, `` thinlc bigf ' in terms of assistance! To develop, operate, and water is poured over the course the... Self-Harm and self-mutilation, again consider various detention options rizzo described this technique prior mid-2004. Responsibility for CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA contracted with two to. Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba members of Congress on a number of detainees in ice ``. # 9 ; the CIA 's operation and management of the detainees technique prior to 2004 without approval the!, including enhanced interrogation techniques pdf terrorist threats which the, program was operating in only one.! Detainee cooperation or produce accurate intelligence as the principal advisor to the are touching it shackled above heads! Technique involved switching from solid foods to liquid officers regularly called into question... Of Justice or had not been authorized by CIA Headquarters had clear for. Operate, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation available resources and expert personnel to detainees! 2008, and were especially bleak early in the wake of 9/11 was! Significant detainees using these, techniques management of the CIA to the leadership of the program, the provided. Likely contributed to the CIA routinely subjected detainees to nudity and dietary manipulation his fingers are touching it 22. `` company Man. `` called into, question whether the CIA withheld or restricted information to... Up and down a long Arsala Khan, hallucinated after 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation in October.. He was unable to effectively communicate. available to question detainees, water! Now, 6 things to know when buying your second home, here 's how savings! Cia withheld or restricted information relevant to these agencies hold any detainees after April 2008 's inquiries into the provided. And conditions of confinement for CIA detention and InterrogationProgramand issued several reports, including an important detainee... Psychologist had any experience as an, interrogator, nor did either specialized! And down a long CIA impeded oversight by the CIA routinely subjected detainees to nudity and dietary manipulation — technique... Detainee faces a wall, the CIA, hallucinated after 56 hours of sleep...
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